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In this paper, we develop an empirical model of an agro-pastoral system subject to 
high climatic risk to test the impact of rainfall variability on livestock densities, land 
allocation patterns and herd mobility observed at the community level.  Also, because 
grazing land is a common-pool resource, we determine the impact of cooperation on 
these decision variables.  To capture different abilities of communities to manage these 
externalities, we construct indices comprised of factors considered to affect the costliness 
of achieving successful cooperation found in the collective action literature.  We then test 
hypotheses regarding the impact of rainfall variability and cooperation using data 
collected in a semi-arid region of Niger.  Results indicate that rainfall variability first 
leads to higher and then lower stock densities, indicating that benefits of accumulating 
large herds in variable environments are eventually offset by the higher risks of low 
production and higher mortality.  Communities with characteristics hypothesized to favor 
cooperation have lower stock densities and greater herd mobility.  Neither cooperation 
nor rainfall variability has a significant impact on the proportion of land allocated to 
crops vs. common pastures. 
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 CLIMATIC VARIABILITY AND COOPERATION IN RANGELAND 









Rainfall variation is often identified as the major risk faced by agro-pastoralists in 
the arid and semi-arid regions of sub-Saharan Africa (Swallow 1994).  In these 
environments, households must adopt mechanisms to manage the variability in 
production of crops and livestock, and to mitigate the impacts of drought when it does 
occur.  Among the many risk management strategies that have been identified, livestock 
mobility is often seen as one of the most valuable, since it enables herders to improve 
mean output as well as decrease output fluctuations associated with both spatial and 
temporal variability in rainfall (e.g. Fleuret 1986; Painter et al. 1994; Swallow 1994; van 
den Brink et al. 1995).  Mobility is facilitated by the common-pool nature of most 
grazing resources, which significantly reduces the transactions costs associated with 
mobility (Niamir-Fuller 1999).  But the common-pool nature of grazing resources also 
means that there are potential externalities, which lead to costs associated with resource 
management.  These externalities, and the extent to which they are managed, will also 
affect decisions on stock densities observed on home pastures, herd mobility, and land 
allocation patterns.  The purpose of this paper is to develop an empirical model that 
incorporates the impact of both rainfall variability and costly cooperation on land use, 
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land allocation and herd mobility decisions, and to apply the model to data collected in 
southwest Niger. 
Issues surrounding the impact of climatic variability on the use and management 
of common resources, the vulnerability of rural households, incentives for privatization, 
and conflicts among resource users are widespread throughout sub-Saharan Africa; and 
are in fact still quite important in North Africa, and West and Central Asia.  In Niger, the 
government began implementing a new rural code in 1993 that attempts to re-define the 
access, use, and management of natural resources in Niger (SecrØtariat Permanent 1993 
1997), though it appears that implementation has stalled (Kirk and Ngaido 2001; Ngaido 
1995; Gado 1996).  While it is widely recognized that climatic variability is an important 
characteristic underlying the logic of the agro-pastoral system, designing a legal 
framework that addresses the need for flexible access while maintaining incentives to use 
and manage the resource have yet to be developed.  Results in this paper should help shed 
light on these wider issues. 
A short review of the literature specific to Niger is presented in the second 
section. This is followed by a review of the theoretical literature on common property, 
resource management, mobility, and risk, leading to a proposed model of pastoral 
production systems.  In the third section, we discuss survey methodology and present 
descriptive statistics for sample communities.  Results from model estimation are 
presented in the fourth section.  We conclude by discussing policy implications and 
extensions to the existing model.    3 
2. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN NIGER  
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
The impact of colonization on the property rights structure of agricultural land has 
taken several forms.  The nationalization of the ￿terres vacantes et sans ma￿tre￿ in 
Francophone coastal west Africa and their subsequent dedication to cash crop production 
led to a profound transformation in land rights, which were imposed by the colonial 
power. Nevertheless, the impact of the French rule in Niger on agricultural land tenure, 
particularly in the more arid regions, was less pronounced than in the highly productive 
coastal regions.  This can be explained by the fact that Niger, because of its unfavourable 
environmental conditions, was mainly seen as a reservoir for labour meaning that land 
was a secondary concern for the colonial power (Raynault 1988). When considering 
rangeland, it is difficult to assess the impact of the colonial rule in Niger on tenure stricto 
sensu; however, one must note that the colonial power did have an impact on pastoralists￿ 
traditional social structures and institutions (Starr 1987).   
Originally, land tenure in Niger￿s agro-pastoral area was characterized by the 
existence of three different types of tenure status.  Up to the time of independence, 
landowners, composed of aristocratic and warrior families, held a primary ownership 
right to village land; this would include, for example, the village chiefs and their lineage, 
and canton chiefs and their lineage.  Chiefs could allocate land and receive the payment.  
Their control over land was attributed to the fact that they were members of families who 
arrived first on the land considered.   Use-rights holders formed a second group.  Having 
a secondary ownership right (they received land from the village and canton chiefs), they 
had to pay tithes. Their use-right was secure and could be inherited by their children.  A   4 
third group was formed by tenant farmers renting fields, who were vulnerable because the 
owner could reclaim his field at any time (Ngaido 1993). 
Following independence, the first regime (Hamani Diori 1960-1974) abolished 
tithe payments and recognized customary ownership.  This created two classes of land 
owners: nobles and aristocrats who saw their customary rights recognized and who 
therefore could alienate land in their possession, and the use-rights holders and tenants 
who, through the suppression of the payment of the tithe, were considered de facto 
owners (non payment of the tithe being the sign of ownership), but who could not 
alienate or divide their land (Ngaido1995). It must be noted however, that a majority of 
tenants and use-right holders continued to respect their traditional obligations and were 
therefore not considered as owners.  The second regime (Seyni KountchØ 1974-1987; Ali 
Sa￿bou 1987-1990) introduced a ￿land to the tiller￿ policy that was supposed to increase 
tenure security to use-right holders and tenants, but was not supported by any legislation 
(Ngaido 1995).  Again, many use-right holders and tenants kept on paying the tithe, in 
essence showing that they were not owners.  Following the demise of KountchØ￿s 
military regime, traditional landowners began to reclaim land that was lost during the 
￿land to tiller policy period￿; their task was facilitated by the lack of legal framework 
supporting this policy.  The final result of these successive reforms has been confusion in 
terms of land tenure, generating tension and increasing conflicts over land tenure (Ngaido 
1995).  Presently, while an initiative (the rural code) to redraft land tenure related 
legislation is being implemented (stalled according to some; e.g., Gado 1996), village and 
canton chiefs remain de facto the principal authority regarding land allocation decisions; 
and customary tenure arrangements still prevail in most areas of the country (Gavian and   5 
Fafchamps 1996).  In terms of tenure security, owners and use-right holders can be 
considered as having secure tenure over land, while tenants always face the risk of losing 
their fields. 
There are two major zones in Niger, the ￿zone de modernization pastorale￿ where 
cropping is prohibited, and ￿zone agropastorale￿, where both cropping and livestock 
production are allowed.  Rangeland had consisted, up to independence, of uncultivated 
areas under the control of the village chief (fallow) or canton chiefs (land that had never 
been cultivated).  These lands were considered as ￿terres de chefferies￿.  Under the Diori 
regime, the ￿terres de chefferies￿ were nationalized when never cultivated in the past, or 
were considered as common village land when in fallow (Ngaido 1993).  Under the 
KountchØ regime, the nationalization of virgin land was confirmed while the status of 
fallow land was left unclear.  After the KountchØ regime, more rangeland was allocated 
to farmers (for cropping) by village chiefs.  This allowed the traditional authorities to 
assert their ￿traditional right￿ over these lands (Ngaido 1993).  Thus, at the present time 
much of Niger￿s rangeland is under the control of groups with a strong agricultural 
tradition.  
Concerns have also been raised about the impact of development policies on land 
use and land allocated to the range.  An example of development policy that has been 
under scrutiny is the ￿terroir￿ approach.  The ￿terroir￿ concept is an approach to land use 
planning that has, in recent years, been favored by French development agencies and by 
governments of former French colonies in the Sahel (Elbow 1996).  The concept of 
￿terroir￿ is originally an analytical unit describing the physical space on which sedentary 
villagers get most of their means of subsistence.  This analytical unit is now used as an   6 
intervention unit in a drive to give rural communities greater responsibility in the 
management of their resources.  However, because it has essentially been used as a 
concept linked with sedentary agriculture, the concept of ￿terroir￿ may not be useful 
when considering households where at least some members practice relatively mobile 
lifestyles (Painter et al. 1994; Marty 1996).  There may be a real risk that the exclusion of 
mobile populations from the current mainstream development paradigm will further 
transform land tenure arrangements that were traditionally adapted to mobility (existence 
of corridors for transhumant livestock, for instance).  Whether or not it is ￿better￿ to 
promote this transformation unfortunately remains an open question. At the very least, 
people dependent on mobility will suffer losses, and some mechanisms for fairly 
handling such cases need to be put in place, or there will likely be a continuance ￿ or 
even an escalation ￿ of violent responses to this transformation.  
THE POPULATION-ENVIRONMENT NEXUS 
Land tenure systems mediate the relationship between humans and the resource 
(Schlager and Ostrom 1992).  Once this relationship is under stress, the mediating 
institution is also under stress.  For instance, GrØgoire (1982) shows that the increasing 
population led to an increase in cultivated area in the village of Gourjae (eastern Niger).  
This change put stress on the local land tenure system and led to an adaptation of pastoral 
practices and the creation of rainy season livestock corridors, thus changing some of the 
rules regarding land use.  However, in many situations, the local land tenure system and 
rules regarding use have not changed, again leading to conflicts over claims to resources 
and most likely to poorer management of those resources.   7 
When population increase occurs in an area prone to drought and desertification, 
it may lead to further degradation of the land resource base (Arrignon 1987, pg. 4,7-22; 
Agnew 1995). Increased population combined with a decrease in the quality of the land 
resource can lead to greater relative and absolute scarcity of agricultural land.  
Agriculturalists then claim more cropland, pushing pastoralists onto every more fragile 
and marginal land.
3   The effect of the population growth in the semi-arid areas of the 
Sahel has been exacerbated by a trend of increased rainfall variability and a decrease in 
absolute rainfall quantity.   
To summarize, the current situation of land tenure in Niger is characterized by 
traditional tenure arrangements that are facing challenges posed by population increase, 
by unfavorable changes in climate, and by the changing political environment.  Because 
the data used below was collected during one period of time, however, we will not be 
able to isolate those factors that affect all communities at any given point in time, such as 
the political environment.  Instead, we focus on those factors that differ among 
communities in order to ascertain the impact of cooperation, climate, and profitability on 
land use and resource management. 
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3.  MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
The model developed in this section focuses on three choice variables within this 
system of land use and allocation: total stock densities on community pastures, the 
proportion of the total herd that migrates to non-community pastures, and the allocation 
of land to crops and to pasture.   Data for all of these variables were collected at the 
community level. One might consider that each of these decisions is an individual 
decision and that levels observed at the community-level are simply the sum of 
household level decisions.  In other words, we observe outcomes at the community level 
that are simply the result of a non-cooperative game being played at the household level.  
In this paper, however, we hypothesize that communities may in fact cooperate.  In 
sample communities, we do not observe formal rules and regulations over herd mobility 
or the use and allocation of land.  Nonetheless, we hypothesize that observed patterns of 
land use (including stock densities on home pastures and herd mobility) and land 
allocation will be a function of a community-level maximization problem which 
incorporates both individual incentives to cooperate and community characteristics 
hypothesized to lower costs of cooperation, following the theoretical model of costly 
cooperation developed in McCarthy et al. 2001.  
In order to clearly highlight the impact of various explanatory variables on each 
decision variable, we consider each decision variable in turn and then present the full 
model and the resulting system of equations to be estimated. 
Stock Densities   
Under any pasture management regime, stock densities will be a positive function 
of the underlying productivity of the range resource and the relative profitability of   9 
livestock production vis-￿-vis alternative activities such as cropping.  Following the 
Boserup (1965) hypothesis, we also include population density as explanatory variable to 
capture the possibility of intensification-driven changes in productivity. 
Standard non-cooperative, one-period game models of use-rates of common 
rangelands give the result that use rates are greater on the commons than would be the 
case under the social optimum, and that the degree of overexploitation increases with the 
number of members (Dasgupta and Heal 1979).  Given that formal rules and regulations 
do not exist in any of the communities studied, then following the non-cooperative 
model, overexploitation should be captured by solely by the number of members.  
However, there is a large body of empirical evidence to support the notion that 
communities are unlikely to either fully cooperate or completely not cooperate (Ostrom 
1990; Oakerson 1992; Baland & Platteau 1996).  In other words, observed outcomes in a 
community are not likely to be the result of a binary choice between perfect cooperation 
and no cooperation, but rather a function of variables often posited to affect the 
￿successfulness￿ of cooperation that have an impact on the margin.   
In a theoretical model of costly cooperation developed in McCarthy et al. (2001), 
equilibrium use levels are directly affected by profit variables and the number of 
members ￿ but an indirect effect also arises via an impact on community-level capacity to 
cooperate, which shift equilibrium use levels ￿ in our case, stock densities.  This is an 
important point since we do not have a direct measure of community capacity itself.   For 
those variables hypothesized to affect only community-level capacity to cooperate, we 
construct an index of this capacity, which is developed in section 5 below.  Another 
subset of variables, however, is hypothesized to affect stock densities directly and   10 
indirectly through community capacity, so that the hypothesized impact of these variables 
is ambiguous where the direct and indirect impacts have opposite signs.  For instance, 
increased profitability is hypothesized to have a direct positive impact on stock densities, 
but also an indirect negative impact because costs of cooperation decrease (McCarthy et 
al. 2001).  An increase in the number of members at first reduces costs of cooperation 
because of lower fixed costs per member, but at some point, higher transactions costs of 
making and enforcing agreements, and greater marginal costs due to greater cumulative 
incentives to cheat, lower relative gains to cooperating and thus lead to higher stock 
densities directly and indirectly. 
While socio-cultural heterogeneity is hypothesized to affect only community-level 
capacity to cooperate, economic heterogeneity may affect both capacity and stock 
densities directly.   First, we hypothesize that heterogeneity in terms of different marginal 
costs, wealth levels, cash constraints, etc., reduces the scope over which mutually 
beneficial agreements might be made thereby making cooperation more costly (Alesina 
and La Ferrara 1999; Johnson and Libecap 1982).   Following Baland & Platteau (1997), 
the direct impact of economic heterogeneity on stock densities is ambiguous.  
Turning now to rainfall variability, as noted above, a group of researchers have 
posited that herders will (attempt) to hold onto more livestock in high variability 
environments.  The reasoning here is that larger herd sizes going into a drought is thought 
to imply a greater probability of coming out of the drought with more animals 
(Livingstone 1991; Fafchamps 1998; Niamir-Fuller 1999)
4.  Similarly, according to 
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proponents of the ￿new range ecology￿, the rationale for holding larger herd sizes is 
greater in high variability, ￿disequilibrium￿ environments since in these environments 
forage productivity is driven almost exclusively by rainfall, with limited or no impact of 
stock densities on future forage productivity (c.f. Behnke et al. 1993).   Conversely, 
another school of thought hypothesizes that stock densities will be lower in high 
variability environments; this hypothesis basically stems from the assumption of risk-
averse producers and holds even when a non-cooperative game framework is used to 
analyze the decision problem.  Sandler and Sterbenz (1990) and McCarthy (1999) show 
that increased variability will lead to lower stock densities under any property rights 
regime.  One of the main hypotheses to be tested below, then, is the sign of the impact of 
rainfall variability on stock densities, and also to test if there is a different effect in 
communities with relatively high variability ￿ a coefficient of variation of about .3 ￿ as 
proposed by the new range ecology. 
To summarize, stock densities are hypothesized to be a function of variables 
affecting profitability, population density, number of community members, 
heterogeneity, variables directly affecting the cooperative capacity of a community, and 
rainfall variability.   The null hypotheses are as follows: 1) profitability variables have a 
positive impact on stock densities, implying that the direct impacts on stock densities are 
stronger than indirect impacts on cooperation; 2) higher population densities lead to 
higher stock densities because of intensification-induced increases in animal productivity, 
3) the number of community members increases stock densities, implying that direct 
effects on stock density and the variable costs of cooperation outweigh declining fixed 
costs of cooperation; 4) heterogeneity in economic characteristics has a positive effect on   12 
stock density primarily through the negative impact on cooperation; 5) lower cooperative 
capacity will unambiguously lead to higher stock densities, and 6) that stock densities 
will be a negative function of rainfall variability.   
 
Mobility   
As detailed above, many researchers have discussed the benefits of mobility in 
capturing the value of ex post adjustments to actual rainfall realizations for the individual 
herder (van den Brink et al. 1995; Thompson and Wilson; 1994), but few economic 
models have considered the incentives for individual herders to engage in mobility when 
one￿s own choice on mobility is affected by the choices of others who share access to the 
same pastures at home.  Freudenberger and Freudendberger (1993) discuss patterns of 
mobility observed in the Ferlo region of Senegal.  They argue that the individual￿s 
decision to engage in mobility depends on how many others remain at home.  The 
description implies that the structure of incentives to engage in mobility resemble a 
chicken game.  Under ￿normal￿ rainfall conditions, each herder would prefer to stay at 
home while at least a certain fraction of others migrate, but the herder also prefers to 
move in the case where no others do so.  Under other rainfall conditions, however, all 
community members may prefer to be mobile or all stay at home, so that the fraction 
moving in any given period will depend on relative rainfall realizations across the region 
of ￿potential￿ mobility.  Mobility will also be a function of relative differences in 
underlying pasture productivity, the transactions costs of mobility, and the number of 
members within a community.     13 
With respect to economic heterogeneity, it is quite possible that wealthier herders 
may have a dominant strategy to always move, whereas poorer herders may have a 
dominant strategy to always remain at home, as discussed in Ruttan (2000).  As the 
number of members increases, the probability that wealthier herders now find it 
profitable to move increases, since profits on the home area will decrease as the number 
of community members increases but profits accruing to the herder engaged in mobility 
do not change when the number of members increases.
5   Thus, the fraction of herders 
moving in any period will also be a positive function of the extent of economic 
heterogeneity.  
To summarize, we hypothesize that:  1) the higher the relative rainfall realizations 
at home, the lower will be herd mobility, 2) the greater the cooperative capacity, the 
greater herd mobility, 3) the better the underlying resource base, the lower herd mobility, 
and 4) the greater the transactions costs involved in mobility, the lower mobility, and 5) 
the greater economic heterogeneity, the greater mobility. 
Land Allocation   
The final decision is the allocation of land between usufruct (de facto private) 
cultivation by individual households and common ￿ or open access ￿ pastures. The 
decisions by community members on stock-days plus the extent to which community 
pastures area accessed by outsiders determine the pasture use-rates and therefore the 
marginal productivity of land allocated to pastures.  This resulting productivity will be 
equated to that arising from cultivation.   In addition, even if there is perfect cooperation 
over stock densities on community pastures, there will be a tendency to under-provide 
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land to the commons meaning that the number of members has both a positive direct 
effect on land allocated to crops, and an indirect positive effect via stock densities to the 
extent that the latter are overexploited (de Janvry et al. 1998).  Put differently, allocating 
land to the common pool is similar to providing a public good, and as such, there will be 
a tendency to under-provide that good irrespective of how the land is used.  If members 
know that the common pool pastures will subsequently be overexploited, then there will 
be a tendency to reduce the allocation of land to the common pastures because of how 
land will be used, once allocated.  These are two distinct effects, often referred to as 
provision and appropriation (de Janvry et al. 1998). As with stock densities, population 
density may lead to intensification of agricultural production through the adoption of 
productivity enhancing investments or changes in practices.  It may also induce greater 
intensification of crop-livestock interactions that may in turn lead to more land allocated 
to crops and higher stock densities.  To the extent that population density induces 
livestock-specific intensification, however, we may expect less land allocated to crops 
but greater stock densities.  The theoretical impact of population density is thus 
ambiguous.  The impact of crop/livestock prices is also ambiguous; the sign depends on 
the nature and strength of crop-livestock interactions.  Finally, we hypothesize that a 
greater number of crop-specific assets, such as plows, granaries, carts, etc., increases land 
allocated to crops at the level of the community.  Though such assets are held by 
individuals, we argue that rent and share arrangements are sufficiently well-developed 
that this variable captures the available supply of crop-specific assets at the community 
level.   15 
With respect to rainfall, to the extent that livestock is less variable than crops, it 
would seem trivial to show that greater land would be allocated to livestock versus crops 
in higher variability environments.  However ￿ as so often happens with models 
incorporating multiple co-variate risks ￿ the sign is actually ambiguous (McCarthy 1999).  
This arises due to externalities generated from the use of common pastures that do not 
arise under individual crop farming.  The presence of both crowding and risk externalities 
has a positive impact on the proportion of land allocated to individual crops vs. common 
pastures because of individuals￿ incentives to minimize this externality, ceteris paribus.  
Nevertheless, the overall impact of rainfall variability on land allocated will also be a 
function of the mean level of rainfall.  We thus hypothesize that, in this semi-arid region, 
the overall impact of rainfall variability on cropland is negative whereas the impact of 
higher rainfall on cropland is positive.   
To summarize, we make the following hypotheses: 1) greater negative 
externalities generated on common pasture lead to a greater proportion of land allocated 
to crops, 2) larger membership in the community also leads to more land allocated to 
crops, 3) population density will lead to more land in crops when density-driven 
intensification favors productivity improvements in crops vs. livestock, 4) higher relative 
crop/livestock prices increase cropland, 5) more crop-specific assets held within the 
community and more infrastructure increase cropland, and 6) higher mean rainfall leads 
to more cropland whereas greater rainfall variability reduces cropland.   16 
The Model:  
Incorporating the arguments presented above leads to the following specification 
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where:  
Mob  =  Proportion of the community herd migrating to outside pastures during the 
rainy and dry seasons, weighted by length of season 
SD   =  stock densities, measured in tropical livestock units per hectare of community 
pastures, 
Crop L   =  proportion of community land allocated to crops  
Pasture L  =  proportion of community land allocated to pastures 
Tot L   =  Total land constraint 
Coop  =  Cooperative capacity of a community (described more fully below) 
 
lim Ca t e Z   =  climate characteristics, including: 
  Home R   =   average rainfall at home 
  Home CoV   =  coefficient of variation of rainfall at home 
  R
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Home  =  rainfall received during the previous rainy season  
 
Comm Z   =  community -level characteristics, including the following: 
   THH   =  total number of households in the community 
   HHph   =  number of households per hectare 
   TluHet   =  coefficient of variation in livestock holdings, measured in 
tropical livestock units (tlu) 
   CostM  =  cost of mobility   
   RQ  =  range quality index   17 
   Plm  =  relative price of livestock to millet  
   Di  =  distance to the nearest regional livestock market   18 
  C-AgAssets  =   the number of crop-specific assets in the village, including 
       oxen, ploughs, transport carts, and crop storage facilities. 
 
Assuming that risk preferences can be captured by the mean and variance in 
rainfall, that induced innovation can be captured using population density as a proxy 
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In the estimated equations above, we use long-term average rainfall for both land 
allocation and stock densities, but rainfall during the preceeding rainy season as an 
explanatory variable in herd mobility equation. Essentially, we are assuming that both 
stock densities and land allocation reflect expectations over rainfall. While this is not a 
strong assumption for cropland, an explanation is needed to justify the assumption for 
stock densities.  Given that stock adjustments to adverse rainfall shocks are likely to 
exhibit lags, we need to consider where we are in terms of ￿drought cycle￿.  In the region 
where the case study communities are located, the year 1990-91 was the last year for 
which rainfall was below two standard deviations for any of the communities.
6   We thus 
assume that any adjustments to stock levels had been made by 1997-98, the period to 
which the survey referred.   Mobility, on the other hand, is hypothesized to be the ex post 
                                                 
6 We did use a dummy to indicate whether or not a rainfall shock had occurred in the preceeding 5 years, 
but the coeffiient was not significant in either the stock density or land allocation equations.   19 
adjustment mechanism to deviations in expected rainfall realizations each year, following 
van den Brink et al. (1995).   Unfortunately, given that we have a cross-sectional data set, 
we cannot directly test the impact of rainfall variability on mobility, which would require 
a panel data set. 
 
4.  COMMUNITY SURVEYS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Monthly rainfall data was collected at 17 rainfall stations for the period 1985 ￿ 
1996; and a list of all communities within a 50 km radius of each station was drawn up. 
Forty community names were randomly drawn from this list.  Data was collected at the 
village level, the primary contact was the village chief, and one of the authors was 
present at every interview. Price data was collected at markets identified as the primary 
markets used by community members.  For the interested reader, a full description of data 
collection methodology is presented in Appendix 1.  In three communities, the 
topography made it virtually impossible to adequately measure total land area and/or to 
complete the range quality assessments, so that the remaining sample consists of 37 
communities.    Descriptive statistics for the endogenous and exogenous variables are 
presented in Table 1 below. 
   20 
Table 1￿Descriptive statistics 
 Mean  Std.Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Endogenous Variables        
  Mobility  (proportion of year)    .18         0    0.42 
  Stock Density   (TLU per hectare)    .74        .01    4.68 
  Proportion of Land in Crops    .33    .16    .09    .42 
Climate Variables        
  Average Rainfall    498.23    90.68    335.70    649.81 
  Coef. of Variation of Rainfall    .23    .06    .08    .37 
  Rainfall in 1996    567.05    109.18    429.75    750.83 
Cooperation Variables        
  Total Households    99.51    70.40    20.00    307.00 
  Coef. of Variation of Livestock Holdings    1.18    .83    .25    4.50 
  Coef. of Variation of Millet Yields    .33    .36    .08    2.22 
  Number of Ethnic Groups    1.62    .89    1.00    4.00 
  Proportion of Households not  









  Proportion of Households with Migrants    .48    .20    .06    .83 
  Use of Community Pastures by Outsiders in  









  Use of Community Pastures by Outsiders in  









  Transhumant Herd Sizes   2408.92    3600.00    0  10,000.00 
Production/Profitability        
  Range Quality Index    1.49    .69    0.01    2.73 
  Relative Price of Livestock to Millet    1.31    .24    .87    1.60 
  Distance to Market (kms.)    32.68    22.64    1.00    79.00 
 
 
In sample communities, the proportion of herds that were mobile during the crop 
year 1996-97 ranged between 0 and 42% with an average of 18%; though it should be 
noted that rainfall during the summer rainy season of 1996 was higher than average in all   21 
but one of the communities.  Average stock densities on home pastures are fairly high at 
￿, though it should be stressed that this figure does not take into account mobility.  Even 
so, only seven communities have densities greater than one and median density is just .3.  
Various estimates of carrying capacity in ￿normal￿ years in the Sahel range between .13-
.25 for the ranges falling on the 400 mm rainfall isohyet (de Leeuw & Tothill 1993, pg. 
78); we suppose that these would be somewhat higher in the study area since average 
rainfall is higher than 500 in 18 of the communities.   Thus, the descriptive statistics 
indicate little evidence of dramatic overstocking in general.  Cropland accounts for 33% 
of total community land on average, ranging from about 10 to 42% in sample 
communities. 
There is a good deal of variation in the total number of households within a 
community, though there are less than 2 ethnic groups per village indicating a relatively 
homogeneous ethnic composition of villages on average.  However, there is great deal of 
variation in livestock holdings within communities.  The coefficient of variation in 
livestock holdings is 1.18; household harvests of millet also vary, but not nearly as much 
as captured in the coefficient of variation of .33. 
 
5.  DATA ANALYSIS  
Before proceeding to the econometric estimations, we first consider how to 
capture the ￿cooperation￿ variable.  As noted above, in none of the study communities 
were there explicit rules on maximum stock levels held by households, total stock 
densities at the community level or mobility.  However, we also know that, being largely 
dependent on livestock products, community members do meet and discuss the condition   22 
of the animals, the weather, and pasture.  Because we have no direct measurements of the 
capacity of the community to cooperate, we instead use factors that have been 
hypothesized to affect the level of cooperation reached in any community (c.f. Ostrom 
1990; Baland and Plateau 1996; Berkes and Folke 1998).  These variables can be 
categorized as follows:  1) those that affect the ability of the community members 
themselves to appropriate any benefits associated with reduced stock densities (as 
opposed to non-members also gaining benefits), 2) those that affect the capacity to 
negotiate and supervise members￿ actions, and 3) those that affect the ability of members 
to reach mutually beneficial agreements amongst themselves.  To capture these effects, 
we derive an index that includes the following variables corresponding to the above 
categories:  1) stock levels of neighboring villages using community pastures in the rainy 
season (RsIN) and in the dry season (DsIN), and dry season stock levels of transhumants 
(Transh), 2) the percent of households where the head of household migrated for work in 
the past year (MigW), and 3) three indicators of heterogeneity.  The first indicator of 
heterogeneity  is the coefficient of variation measure based on information provided on 
the smallest, largest and average harvests.  While landholdings would have been 
preferred, only information on differences in total harvests is available.  It is 
hypothesized that large differences in wealth reduce the range over which common 
agreements can be formed (Alesina and La Ferrara 1999).  The second and third are 
measures of the ethnic heterogeneity, captured by the number of ethnic groups in a 
village and the proportion of households that are not a part of the ethnic majority. We 
hypothesize that ethnic heterogeneity may make informal cooperation, based largely on 
social norms, more difficult.    23 
One way to capture the effect of these variables is to simply include all of them in 
the estimated equations.  However, there is a great deal of correlation among these 
variables, which poses serious estimation problems given the sample size. Thus, we used 
a factor analysis ￿ specifically, iterated principal factors -- to construct indices. Results 
for the first two factors, which had eigenvalues greater than 1, are presented below. 
 
   Factor  1 Factor2 
 Eigenvalue  1.56  1.23 
 Cumulative  .43  .77 
 
Scoring Coefficients  Factor 1  Factor 2 
  Coef. of Variation in crop yields  -.02  .57 
  Number of Ethnic Groups  .51  -.08 
  % Not of Ethnic Majority  .27  .06 
  Average Number of Households 
    with Members Migrating for Wage Work  -.06  .09   
  Dry Season In-Migration  .27  -.04 
  Rainy Season In-Migration  .12  .37 
 Transhumants  In-Migration  .09  -.03 
  
The first factor has relatively high and positive coefficients on variables 
representing pressure on home resources by non-community members, as well as high 
and positive scores on the ethnic heterogeneity variables.   Migration and heterogeneity in 
cropland holdings have negative but relatively small coefficients.  We interpret this 
variable as capturing factors that make cooperation more difficult, particularly with 
respect to the use and management of home pasture resources, and refer to it hereafter as   24 
1Coop Cost .  The second factor has high and positive coefficients on heterogeneity in 
cropped land and rainy season in-migration, and to a lesser extent, migration for wage 
work.  We consider this variable to capture the factors that make cooperation more 
difficult particularly for managing crop-livestock interactions.  We hereafter refer to the 
variable as  2Coop Cost . 
We now return to the model developed in section 2, and attend to some practical 
difficulties in estimating the model.   First, the structural model developed above requires 
estimating a system of simultaneous equations.  Given the data, we must estimate a 
reduced form model. Second, we must specify an econometric model to test hypotheses 
regarding overexploitation and cooperation.  Theoretically, the extent of overexploitation 
will be a function of the number of households. Cooperation may offset ￿ at least to some 
extent -- the impact of the number of members, but there are a number of empirical 
specifications that can capture these effects.  We considered three specifications.  In the 
first specification, we include only the total number of households.  Under the 
assumption of either complete cooperation or non-cooperation, a significant and positive 
coefficient on the number of households supports the non-cooperative hypothesis.  
However, even if the coefficient is positive, we have no statistical capacity to test 
whether non-cooperation is ￿complete￿ under this specification.  In the second 
specification, we include total households and the cooperation costs indices,  1Coop Cost  
and 2Coop Cost , to allow for differing ￿levels￿ of cooperation to be reached across 
communities.  In the third specification, we drop the total household variable, and instead 
include interaction terms composed of the cooperation cost indices multiplied by the   25 
number of households ( 1Coop Cost HH  and  2Coop Cost HH ).     The second and third 
specifications perform quite similarly, so we present only the results from the second 
specification in the text below. 
We also would like to test whether or not the coefficient of variation in rainfall 
has a different effect in areas with relatively high vs. relatively low rainfall variability.  
The new range ecology literature suggests that areas exhibiting coefficients of variation 
greater than .3 may be characterized as ￿disequilibrial￿.  Given the rather short-term 
nature of our rainfall data, we have only 6 communities with coefficients of variation 
greater than .3; there does appear to be a distinct ￿break￿ between communities above 
and below .25, however.  The theory provides only rough guidance for the exact 
functional form to use to distinguish between areas, but range ecologists consider the case 
study area to be one that may exhibit both equilibrial and disequilibrial rangeland.  We 
estimated the equations using the coefficient and the coefficient squared, and we also 
estimated the equation using the coefficient, a dummy for high variability areas, and an 
interaction term to capture different slope effects.  In the estimations presented below, we 
present results using the coefficient and its square; results for the shift and slope dummies 
are quite similar but less efficient. 
Next, mobility was not undertaken in 15 of the 36 communities, and so we 
estimate this equation as a tobit.    Also, we use total rainfall received during 1996 to 
capture the ex post adjustment nature of mobility instead of the ratio between actual 
rainfall at home to actual rainfall in the areas of potential mobility.   We assume that 
herders in sample communities have access to the same sites in the outside world, so that 
denominator in the home/away rainfall ratio is the same for all communities.    26 
Incorporating these considerations leads to estimated equations are given below for the 
specification capturing an multiplicative impact of cooperation costs and households:   
96 2
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The only difference for the additive specification is that  1Coop Cost HH  and 
2Coop Cost HH  in the above equations would be replaced by  1 , 2 Coop Coop Cost Cost  and 
THH .   
The reduced form makes interpretation of the coefficients difficult when a 
variable in the structural model appears in more than one equation, since in the reduced 
form, the variable then picks up both direct and indirect effects.  For instance, non-
cooperation should increase stock densities which should indirectly increase mobility, but 
the direct impact of non-cooperation should be to reduce mobility.  We consider these 
direct and indirect impacts when discussing estimation results below. 
All variables are defined as above, with the exception of the costs of mobility.  Of 
course, there are no market prices for the costs of mobility.  Instead, we use a dummy 
variable for whether or not the ethnic majority in the community is from a traditionally 
pastoralist tribe (EthnM), which is hypothesized to reduce costs of mobility via access to 
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The first set of equations for mobility, stock densities and land allocation include 
only total households and heterogeneity in livestock holdings as regressors capturing the 
extent of non-cooperation.  The total household variable is not significant in any of the 
equations, and heterogeneity in livestock holding is only significant in the stock density 
equation.  Alternatively, the second set of equations includes the costs of cooperation 
indices.  These equations uniformly exhibit better goodness-of-fit measures and p-values 
on individual coefficients are consistently higher.  In the following, then, we discuss 
results for this second specification only.   
Looking first at the climatic variables, we note that the coefficient of variation of 
rainfall does indeed have nonlinear relationship with stock densities, but opposite to the 
impact that would be consistent with hypotheses stemming from new range ecology 
and/or herd accumulation models.  In sample communities, higher variability initially 
leads to greater stock densities but the impact becomes negative for coefficients greater 
than about .27.   If it were rational to accumulate herds in anticipation of a drought, 
particularly in areas where long-term forage productivity is posited to be relatively 
unaffected by stock densities, then we would expect higher stock densities particularly in 
high variability areas, ceteris paribus.  Our data, however, does not support this 
hypothesis.   Rather, it appears that gains from shifting more heavily into livestock as 
variability increases are eventually outweighed by risk externalities generated from the 
use of common-pool pastures as rainfall variability increases still further.  Rainfall 
variability has a similar impact on mobility; mobility at first increases and then decreases 
with increases in variability.  In the reduced form model, these variables should be 
picking up the effect of stock densities on mobility; higher stock densities lead to greater   29 
mobility, as predicted.  Recent rainfall has a significant negative impact on mobility 
whereas average rainfall has no impact.  Interestingly, none of the climate variables has a 
statistically significant impact on cropland.   
Consider next the cooperation variables, captured in the cost of cooperation 
indices and heterogeneity in livestock holdings.  The first index of cooperation costs has 
a significant and positive impact on stock densities and on mobility. However, whereas 
the second index also has a significant and positive coefficient in the stock density 
equation, the coefficient is negative and significant in the mobility equation.   The first 
cost index appears to capture the indirect effect of higher stock densities on mobility, 
whereas the second index appears to capture the direct negative effect of increased costs 
of cooperation on mobility.   Heterogeneity in livestock holdings also has a differential 
impact on ￿cooperation￿ as predicted.  The coefficient is positive and significant in both 
stock density and mobility equations.  We hypothesized that livestock heterogeneity 
would contribute to overgrazing as captured in the stock density equations, but would 
also foster mobility.   Finally, we note that only the second cost index has a significant 
impact on land allocated to crops.  However, the negative coefficient is opposite to that 
hypothesized, since both direct and indirect impacts are hypothesized to be positive.  The 
second index has a relatively high scoring coefficient on rainy season in-migration; thus, 
claims by outsiders, particularly to community resources during the cropping season, 
appears to limit land allocated to crops.  Unfortunately, given the dataset, we cannot 
explore this hypothesis further.  
With respect to community characteristics and infrastructure, we note that the 
coefficient on household density is significant in all three equations.  Household density   30 
has a positive impact on stock densities and mobility, but a negative impact on land 
allocated to crops.  Though the usual presumption is that increasing population density 
will increase pressure to open up marginal lands to cultivation, that does not appear to be 
the case in the communities in this particular region in Niger.  This is all the more 
surprising given that government and NGO technical projects tend to support 
intensification of cropping activities.  As can be seen in Fig. 3 below, however, there is a 
clear negative relationship between cropland and household density
7; a relationship that 
remains strong in the multivariate analysis.   If increasing household density does indeed 
capture intensification, the intensification in this system appears to be occurring with 
respect to livestock, inducing greater stock densities, increased mobility, and less land 
allocated to crops. 
The stock of agricultural assets per household in the community has a significant 
and positive impact on cropland, but no impact on either stock densities or mobility.  
Whether the ethnic majority is traditionally pastoralist surprisingly has no impact on 
mobility, or on stock densities or cropland.  Range quality has a positive impact on 
mobility and land allocated to crops, but the coefficient on stock densities is positive but 
not significant.  Finally, relative livestock: millet prices have a significant and positive 
impact on mobility; this should be an indirect impact through higher stock densities.  
However, there is no statistically significant impact of relative prices on either stock 
densities or cropland.  Distance to market has a strong negative impact on stock densities. 
                                                 
7 Plotting percent of land in crops against total households gives a similar result.   31 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
There are a number of conclusions to be drawn from the above analysis.  First, 
stock densities in sample communities do not support a conclusion of universal over-
exploitation of pastures, as would be the case if the ￿tragedy of the commons￿ argument 
held.  However, there is a wide range of stock densities and herd mobility observed.  
Second, even in the universal absence of formal ￿rules￿ or regulations regarding stocking 
rates on common pastures or herd mobility, factors associated with the costs of achieving 
collective action to secure cooperation at the community level do impact decisions on 
stocking rates and on mobility.   Though difficult to address directly through policy 
measures, the results reinforce the notion that devolution of natural resource management 
must consider factors that influence the costs of cooperation.   For instance, results 
indicate that heterogeneity in ethnicity and wealth may make cooperation more costly, 
and programs that promote collective action should take into account the higher costs of 
achieving collective action in these villages.  Federated structures, graduated schedules of 
benefits, taxes, and/or fines, or sub-group formation has improved collective action in 
other countries/activities, though this analysis cannot provide any further information on 
the specific management structures.  
Also, we have shown that rainfall variability has an inverted-U shaped 
relationship with stock densities and mobility, though no impact on percent of land 
allocated to crops.  Results for stock densities are consistent with results from Kamara et 
al. (2001) from a similar study undertaken in Ethiopia, where rainfall variability also has 
a negative impact on stock densities precisely in the high variability environments.  This 
result is important, because many drought mitigation and preparedness measures are   32 
predicated on the belief that policy measures that offset the impact of rainfall variability 
on livestock production will lead to lower stock densities.  Our results do not support this 
belief; rather, it is likely that stock densities would increase in response to measures 
directly aimed at reducing the impact of poor rainfall on output, at least in regions 
characterized by high rainfall variability.  Complimentary policies need to be developed 
that mitigate the impacts of drought and also increase off-take.  
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Figure 2--Schematic description of the rainy season pastoral action space 
The different spatial sub units are separated by the discontinued line.  The first sub unit 
consists of the village rangeland (A).  The second unit consists of rangeland nearby (B) 
under the jurisdiction of nearby villages or under the jurisdiction of the district chief.  
Access to this rangeland is never negotiated.  A third sub unit consists of rangelands that 
are 20 to 50 km from the village (C) and that are used during the late dry season when 
rain onset in the village is late.  Access to this rangeland is sometimes negotiated (it used 
to be strictly negotiated).  Finally there are the pastures reached during transhumance 
(100 to 200 km away) (D) for which there is no negotiation for access.  These sub units 
can be directly connected allowing a smooth passage from one to the other, or, more 
often, they are connected by transhumance corridors (E). 
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Appendix 1--Community surveys and descriptive statistics 
A stratified sample of forty villages was determined, where the stratification 
criteria were average annual rainfall and rainfall variability.   Because of topological 
characteristics, it was impossible to adequately measure total land area in three 
communities and/or to complete the range quality assessments.  
In order to minimize soil variations, all villages were chosen on the edge of the 
continental shield between 12°30￿ and 14°30￿ north, and between the second and the 
fourth eastern meridians.  Villages were selected near meteorological stations for which 
rainfall data were available from 1988 to 1996.  Seventeen meteorological stations had all 
monthly data for the period considered, while eleven needed the interpolation of a 
minority of their monthly data. When necessary, monthly rainfall were interpolated using 
the iterative polygon method.  A map showing the survey area is presented in Figure 1.  
This data was augmented with rainfall data obtained from the University of Delaware 
dataset for Africa, spanning 1950 ￿ 1999.  While the average monthly and annual rainfall 
figures were quite similar for both datasets, the coefficient of variation was greater for 
data collected at rainfall stations, though this data series is of shorter time duration
8.   
Mobility.  Of the forty villages surveyed, a majority (25) had a part of their 
livestock away from their village land during some part of the rainy season, and a 
minority engaged in transhumance during the dry season (9).   Community members have 
access to a wide range of pastures of the ￿outside￿ world.  This is at the cost of labor to 
                                                 
8 The longer time series data is generated using spatial interpolation techniques, and these techniques tend 
to dampen measures of spatial variability.   43 
guard and herd the animals on outside pastures, and in some cases, the cost of increased 
risks of livestock losses.   
Short term (less than one month) movements to pastures less than 50 kilometers 
away occurred generally (and not necessarily every year) towards the end of the dry 
season. Access to these pastures can be negotiated or not.  In our sample, negotiations 
occurred in cases where the destination area was under the jurisdiction of a traditional 
Fulani encampment area.  The most important destinations for long term (lasting four 
months or longer) transhumance during the rainy season are pastures in Northern Niger 
and, more recently, southern Benin.  Informants across different Fulani encampments 
agreed that transhumance to Benin dated from the 1982-1983 drought and that, while 
pasture quality is inferior, pasture quantity and livestock safety are better in Benin.   
However, in our estimated equations, we did not distinguish between long and 
short distance mobility.   Instead, we set mobility equal to the proportion of total herds 
migrating during the dry season and the rainy season; weighting the rainy season by 5/12 
and the dry season by 7/12 to arrive at total proportion of mobility through the year.   
Participatory mapping.  In each village, community level interviews with key 
informants (village chief and their advisors) were conducted.  The participatory mapping 
consisted of the progressive drawing in the sand, by the community members, of the 
village land including the location of fields, pastures, water, areas of particular 
geographical interest etc.  While the different elements of the map were identified, 
questions were raised regarding their use and eventually their management.  The 
participatory mapping contributed to the building of a healthy relationship between   44 
investigators and interviewees, as well as to a common understanding of the research 
theme and objectives.  
Resource assessment.  A precise determination of the village land boundaries and 
an assessment of the village￿s grazing resources was then conducted. The preparation of 
this field survey consisted of the preliminary identification of the different geographical 
units of the village land using a 1/50,000 base map.   
When physical presence on the village land boundaries was possible, their 
location was recorded (under digital format) using a twelve-channel Global Positioning 
System.  The boundaries were also recorded by drawing them on an overlay to the 
1/50,000 map.  When physical presence on the boundaries was not possible due to steep 
hills or ravines, the base map was used to interpret the information given by the village 
chief before drawing the borders on the overlay. 
The resource assessment consisted of a survey conducted for each of the 
geographical units that were identified during the field survey preparation. For each 
geographical unit, the following information was geo-referenced and was visually 
estimated: proportion of fallow, bush, cultivated and barren land; millet density on 
cultivated fields; species composition (three dominant species) for the herbaceous layer 
and species composition for the tree layer (three dominant species); and level of grazing 
on the pastures.  The maps were digitized and stored using a Geographic Information 
System.   For a subset of villages, the mapping exercise in the fields is supplemented by a 
visual interpretation of satellite images (Spot multi spectral).   This information was used 
to generate total land area, and the proportion of land dedicated to pastures and crops.   45 
The information on species composition and density were used to generate a 
range quality index for each of the geographical units identified on the village land, using 
a score of 1 to 5.  Range quality for each village is computed using the following 
formula, where i is a pasture score and Ai the proportion of the area available for pasture 
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Gathering of socioeconomic data.  Once the field survey was completed, group 
interviews were conducted to gather socioeconomic data.  Data collected included 
number of cattle, goats and sheep (usually by sub-community units), average and 
maximum holdings of each livestock species, the number of households without cattle, 
average and maximum cropland holdings, ethnic composition and number of languages 
spoken within the community, use of the community pastures by non-community 
members in the dry and in the rainy season, and the proportion of community members 
who had at least one member who migrated for wage work.  Additional information was 
collected on basic infrastructure, and also on the stock of crop-specific assets, including 
ploughs, carts, storage facilities, etc.  Also, there was little information on the costs of 
mobility (in communities that relied on hired herders), but this information was only 
available for a small subset of communities.  We thus used information on whether 
community members come from a tribe recognized as being traditionally pastoralist, in 
order to capture accumulated knowledge, and the percent of households still considered 
￿pastoralist￿ by community members, to capture capacity to collect current information 
regarding conditions on outside pastures.   46 
Land Allocation. Using the results of the surveys one can schematically represent 
the pastoral action space of a community, as depicted in Figure 2.  First there is the 
village land corresponding to the French concept of  ￿terroir foncier￿ (Le Bris 1982).  
The land encompassed in the ￿terroir foncier￿ is under the jurisdiction of the village 
chief.   Certain decisions regarding land use are taken at the individual level (short term 
fallow), but allocating use rights to cropland is undertaken at the level of the village 
chief.  The quantity of rangeland available on the ￿terroir foncier￿ will therefore be the 
result of decisions by the chief.  In our model, we assume that land allocation will be a 
function of the sum of individual incentives to privately appropriate crop land, which are 
themselves dependent on stock densities on the common pastures.  Cooperation is 
hypothesized to offset the tendency to over-stock and under-provide common pastures.  
In the field, this means that we hypothesize that land allocation decisions by the chief will 
be a function of cooperative capacity, and the costliness of making and enforcing 
decisions.  And, the costs of cooperation are a function of individual incentives to abide 
by community-level decisions.  Thus, we hypothesize that observed land allocation 
patterns will be affected by these variables, mediated through the institution of the chief. 
Livestock price survey.  A separate livestock price survey was conducted in 10 
markets that were identified during the community surveys.   Each market was visited 6 
times during a twelve-week period.  Small ruminants were weighed.  Girth measurement 
was taken from cattle in order to estimate their liveweight; the physical condition of cattle 
was scored using the method explained in Nicholson and Butterworth (1986).   Because 
animals are sold standing, we estimated a per unit value, using girth, physical condition 
score, age, and date of sale.  This estimation was used to generate a price per kg. for  a 3   47 
‰ year old male bull of quality 2.5, which is the price used in the estimations below.  We 
chose to use cattle as representative since the price information was the richest, cattle 
represent the majority of tropical livestock units in all but one community, and all 
livestock prices were highly correlated.  Millet prices per kg were also collected and used 
to generate the relative price of livestock to millet.CAPRi WORKING PAPERS 
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